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Abstract. Connected vehicles have great potential to benefit society, yet create huge challenges.  
Vehicles, infrastructure and enterprise activities combine to form massively complex systems of 
systems (SoSs) that are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Security is ill-defined, making it difficult to 
achieve a consistent, common understanding of security capabilities across the diverse industries that 
collaborate to develop connected vehicles. Rigorous evaluation is essential for developing strong 
security assurance cases. This paper contributes a model-based systems engineering (MBSE) on-
tology that enables integrated evaluation processes in enterprise SoSs. The Evaluation Ontology 
allows diverse types of evaluation to be captured in a single integrated model.  A connected vehicle 
security story is presented to demonstrate the value of the approach. Benefits include enhanced 
business intelligence that can provide a quantifiable, reportable level of confidence in securi-
ty-related processes and technologies. Further work will extend the ontology to develop a cus-
tomisable suite of enabling patterns for security. 
Introduction 
Modern engineering demands an approach that allows engineers to deal with enormous complexity 
[Sillito 2014]. Model-based systems engineering (MBSE) has become well established in many in-
dustries as a leading means of addressing complexity in security critical systems [Kerzhner et al. 
2015] [Oates et al. 2015] [Roudier & Apvrille 2015]. Automotive manufacturers, such as Daimler, 
have identified MBSE as a means of addressing the multiple strategic challenges that future mobility 
presents to the industry [Haasis 2016]. 
Connected vehicles have great potential to benefit society: they can reduce accidents [Yang et al. 
2017], reduce pollution [Li, Q 2015] and make journeys quicker and easier. Because they extensively 
employ networked technologies, they also create great challenges, being massively complex, vul-
nerable to cyber-attacks, and threatening privacy. To operate securely, connected vehicles must be 




Connected vehicles and the enterprise environments in which they are created, operated, maintained, 
retired and destroyed can be considered as complex, software-intensive systems of systems (SoS) 
[Kurrle, et al. 2016]. This view of connected vehicle enterprises fits with both Maier's criteria [Maier 
1998] and Jamshidi's broader definition stating “SoSs are large-scale integrated systems which are 
heterogeneous and independently operable on their own, but are networked together for a common 
goal” [Jamshidi 2009]. 
This paper applies MBSE to systems of systems (SoSs), and addresses the specific problem of how to 
ensure that evaluation processes across the enterprise are implemented consistently and rigorously.  
We present an Evaluation Ontology (EO) that provides a basis for a common understanding of 
evaluation processes across diverse industries, and address the problem of how to ensure that eval-
uation processes across the enterprise are implemented consistently and rigorously.  
EO is one example of a method for enhancing enterprise capability in this regard. By way of example, 
we apply EO to an automotive security assurance case in consideration of the fact that SoSs “pose 
particular issues from a security perspective” [INCOSE 2015]. Connectivity brings automotive 
systems into a realm of previously unheard of complexity and with this comes a pressing need for 
new methods to assure systems. The complexity also involved in developing secure connected ve-
hicles makes this domain an ideal proving ground for our approach. The EO has much wider ap-
plicability to all manner of evaluations, including other types of assurance case. 
Enabling ontologies are implementation independent and provide an easily understood way to facil-
itate the application of MBSE to problems. They can bridge the gap between those responsible for the 
enterprise system and those responsible for its products and services. By describing required be-
haviour at a high level they can be specialised and applied to define a coherent set of relevant prac-
tices for all activities at all levels of all organisations in an enterprise.  
Application to Security 
Security is hard to define. Across standards a variety of definitions exist, falling broadly into three 
categories that identify security as: preserving properties of a system [ISO 2012]; absence of prop-
erties from a system [BSI 2018:1085] [BSI 2018:1885]; or a set of measures taken during the 
lifecycle of the system [Boyes, H and Isbell, R 2017] [BIMCO 2016] [NIST 2014] [SAE 2016]. This 
represents an additional challenge for those seeking to build secure systems as various stakeholders 
may have different ideas of what security means, possibly without even realising this. In this work we 
take the third point of view for consistency with ‘SAE J3061: Cybersecurity Guidebook for 
Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems’ [SAE 2016], which has become established as the leading guide-
line in the field of automotive cybersecurity.  
There is a strong business case for establishing an evaluation framework that can be applied uni-
versally across all functions (not just to functions that promote security) within the connected vehicle 
enterprise. A typical enterprise might comprise a traditional automotive supply chain plus mobility 
partners, communications networks, app developers, cloud data storage, insurance, recyclers, intel-
ligent transport systems (ITS), emergency services and more. EO spans processes as diverse as: 
threat/hazard and risk analysis, recruitment, tool selection, sub-system selection, compliance audit-
ing, and design choices, all of which have a bearing on the development of secure systems. 
In the remainder of this paper we clarify the Conventions used and present EO. We illustrate a real-
istic application in An Automotive Security Story and discuss the benefits of the method in the 




SysML. Diagrams are presented in accordance with ‘OMG System Modeling Language’ Version 1.3 
[Object Management Group 2012] (hereinafter referred to as SysML). 
Framework for Architectural Frameworks. The Evaluation Ontology (EO) presented in this paper 
is constructed in accordance with the SysML-based Framework for Architectural Frameworks (FAF) 
as described in [Holt, J and Perry, S 2013]. 
We also adopt the textual notation used in [Holt, J and Perry, S 2013]. Specifically: 
 All terms from the SysML notation that form part of the standard are written in italics. Therefore, 
the use of block refers to the SysML construct, whereas the same word without italics – block – 
refers to an impediment. 
 All terms that are defined as part of the overall model presented in [Holt, J and Perry, S 2013] or 
as part of this paper are presented with capitalised words. Therefore the use of System refers to an 
Ontology Element called System, whereas the same word without capitals – system – refers to a 
non-specific usage of the term as a noun or verb. References to section titles in this report are also 
capitalised. 
 All words that are being referenced from a specific diagram are shown in quotes. Therefore, the 
use of ‘Ontology Element’ is referring to a specific element in a specific diagram. 
 All names are written as singular. Therefore, the term Enabling System may refer to any number 
of systems, rather than a single one. 
Definitions. The following key definitions apply in this document: 
enterprise “one or more organizations sharing a definite mission, goals, and objectives to offer an 
output such as a product or service” [ISO 2005] 
security measures taken to protect a system against unauthorized access or attack (adapted 
from the definition of cybersecurity in [SAE 2016]) 
cybersecurity “measures taken to protect a cyber-physical system against unauthorized access or 
attack” [SAE 2016] 
evaluation “making of a judgement about the amount, number, or value of something; assess-
ment” [Oxford 2018]; to apply the Evaluation Ontology to a System 
Symbols. Standard SysML symbols are used with the following additions: 
Indicates that a block also appears on a separate diagram that describes additional 
ontology elements and relationships 
 Thick dashed border indicates the boundary of a Viewpoint. Grey and black are used 
to assist with distinguishing different boundaries but have no other meaning. 
Notes. Please note the following: 
 «ontology element» appears on most blocks, in several cases the text is truncated with … purely 
for reasons of space; truncated text has the same meaning as the full term. 
 Where the name of an «ontology element» contains the symbols :: this indicates that the element 
is adopted from the patterns described in [Holt, J and Perry, S 2013]. 
 
 
The Evaluation Ontology 
 
Figure 1: The ‘System under Evaluation’ context diagram 
The Evaluation Ontology (EO), shown in Figure 2, describes a set of concepts and relationships that 
together facilitate the modelling of evaluation processes and outcomes. The context for the ‘System 
Under Evaluation’ is shown in Figure 1. The key actors are represented outside the ‘System under 
Evaluation’ boundary as SysML blocks instead of traditional stickmen actors. This approach is 
recommended by [Weilkiens 2012] for systems of systems. In this work, the intention is to help the 
reader to visualise the recursive nature in which the ontology should be applied. For example, a 
person who is an ‘Evaluator’ in a security assessment would themselves have been the ‘System 
Under Evaluation’ when they were going through the recruitment process for their role. This illus-
trates another important point to bear in mind, which is that this ontology treats human, non-human 
and mixed groupings as being valid types of System. 
The purpose of the ontology is to provide a framework that allows diverse types of evaluation to be 
captured in a single integrated model. EO can be applied recursively, so models built on EO are 
flexible and scalable. Every time an evaluation is mapped to the framework, its data becomes 
available and discoverable across the enterprise in a rigorous, standardised format. The practice of 
creating a mapping delivers its own benefits as it encourages each ‘System under Evaluation 
Stakeholder’ to identify their role(s) and systematically record ‘Need’, ‘Evidence’, ‘Evaluation 
Method’ and ‘Evaluation Result’. This means every mapping of an evaluation is immediately useful, 
even if not connected to others. So, as is often pragmatic, organisations can start with a small focused 
study to gain experience with the framework. 
To aid with understanding the ontology, we have partitioned it into three viewpoints, as shown by the 





Figure 2. ‘Ontology Definition View showing Evaluation Ontology concepts’ (additional partition-
ing to show viewpoints and aid with reading this paper) 
The true power of applying the ontology does not manifest until multiple evaluations are captured in 
an integrated model. Several benefits are summarised in the Conclusions section. To illustrate how a 
connected vehicle enterprise could benefit from applying EO we have constructed a user story to 
guide the reader through a realistic application. This is a story we have developed for the purpose of 
explaining how to apply the Evaluation Ontology in an automotive cybersecurity context. Any re-
semblance to actual organisations or individuals is coincidental. In future work we intend to conduct 
a real-world study along similar lines. 
A number of design principles were adopted to guide the development of EO: 
Maximum applicability. A key purpose of EO is to allow enterprises to capture information about 
and resulting from all their evaluation processes in a single, integrated model. Therefore it is essential 
that the ontology is sufficiently generic that it can be applied to any type of evaluation, regardless of 
 
 
the subject of the evaluations or whether they are performed by human or technical systems (or a 
combination of the two). 
Recursivity. Evaluation systems may themselves be the subject of evaluation, therefore the ontology 
must be recursive in nature so that it can be applied iteratively. 
Consistency. Two of the authors have previously described an extensive and widely implemented 
ontology for systems engineering [Holt, J and Perry, S 2013]. To maximise the usefulness and ease of 
implementation of EO, consistency has been maintained with this prior work. This is especially 
important for future real-world case studies, which we anticipate will take place in organisations 
already implementing Holt and Perry’s ontology. EO is also intended to help organisations improve 
consistency across their various evaluation processes. 
An Automotive Security Story 
Chapter 1: Evaluation Decision Maker Viewpoint (EDMVp) 
 
Figure 3: EDMVp scope (included to allow reader to quickly identify EDMVp in Figure 2) 
The Scope of the Evaluation Decision Maker Viewpoint is depicted in Figure 3. An automobile 
manufacturer, Comfortable And Secure Transport (CoAST), develops a security auditing model built 
on EO. They call this instantiation of ‘Evaluation System’ the Security Evaluation Approach (SEA) 
(see Figure 4). Employees at CoAST are working closely with peers in supply chain and partner 
organisations to develop a new connected vehicle, which they have named CoVe (Connected Vehi-
cle). They are working particularly closely with: Wi-Fi and Audio Vehicle Entertainment (WAVE), 
who supply a preassembled navigation and communications console, and Big AppY (BAY), who are 
developing a mobile app that can control vehicle features including door locks. They will conduct a 
pilot study of SEA across this core group of organisations, which they call the System Architecture 
Network of Developers (SAND). 
Together, CoAST’s car platform, WAVE’s console and BAY’s app form a vehicle System of Sys-
tems (SoS). The SAND business processes that must interact in order to develop this vehicle SoS 
form an enterprise SoS, and the vehicle SoS is an output of the enterprise SoS. 
The technical leads for SAND (the SAND leads) at each organisation, Carl, Wendy, and Betty re-
spectively, have formed a ‘Decision Making Panel’ to steer the development. Carl, Wendy, and Betty 
‘Need’ to ensure that the ‘System of Systems’ they develop is secure. Their customers ‘Need’ a 
usable product. The SAND leads ‘Need’ to demonstrate that they have taken a structured approach to 
following the state of the art (in case they ever end up in court). The ‘Decision Making Panel’ has 
interpreted these ‘Need’ to develop the ‘Purpose’ of SEA. They decide that SEA shall be used to 
assess and monitor the capabilities of suppliers and partner organisations with respect to the re-
quirements of J3061. They model J3061 as an instance of ‘Standard’ in SEA. They recognise that 
there are many other ‘Need’ relating to the vehicle’s security and that implementing J3061 may not 
 
 
meet them all. It is also clear to them that, for the pilot study, they will not be able to implement the 
whole guideline. Because they are at the start of their development cycle, they decide to focus on the 
most relevant guiding principles (‘Need’) for the pilot study. These are specified in Section 5.4 of 
J3061 as follows: 
5.4 Implement Cybersecurity in Concept and Design Phases 
 Design the feature with Cybersecurity in mind, starting in the concept phase of the development 
lifecycle. Engineers should consider Cybersecurity when defining the requirements that are to be 
met for the system and feature(s). 
 Analyze threats (i.e., initiated external or internal to the system) to determine what will be faced 
by the system. For the determined threats, identify any vulnerabilities and determine the ap-
propriate Cybersecurity controls. 
 Implement Cybersecurity analysis (and management tools) that enable engineers to determine 
and configure the optimal Cybersecurity level for the system. 
Interpreting these ‘Need’ leads the ‘Decision Making Panel’ to identify that several interrelated 
evaluations will be required. They decide to decompose the SEA ‘Evaluation System’ into three child 
systems, each of which is an ‘Evaluation System’ in its own right. The purposes of the evaluations are 
therefore: 
1. Establish capability of organisations to “Design the feature with Cybersecurity in mind” 
2. “Analyze threats … to determine what will be faced by the system” 
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Figure 4: Nested evaluations in the Security Evaluation Approach 
 
 
Chapter 2: Evaluation System Properties Viewpoint (ESPVp) 
 
Figure 5: ESPVp scope (included to allow reader to quickly identify ESPVp in Figure 2) 
Having decided on the ‘Purpose’ for their four ‘Evaluation System’ (one parent system with three 
child systems), the SAND leads can now set up (instantiate) those systems. Figure 6 illustrates how 
the various concepts related to ‘System’ are structured. 
The ‘Evaluation System’ will be run by humans (as is normally the case at present). The key task is to 
appoint the ‘Evaluation Panel’ for the parent and child evaluations (4 panels). One person from each 
SAND organization is nominated to each panel, with CoAST chairing (as the major stakeholder). The 
SAND leads do not include themselves, instead choosing to be part of the parent evaluation that will 
roll up the results. They decide that the parent evaluation should also include representatives from 
each of the child evaluations, with Carl as chair. They also agree and document the terms of reference 
for the panels. Finally, they agree that the ‘Decision Making Panel’ that considers the ‘Evaluation 
result’ of the parent evaluation will comprise the SAND leads plus one of CoAST’s chief engineers. 
They agree that decisions will be made by majority vote, with the chief engineer having final au-
thority in the case of a split decision. Note that the child evaluations do not include a ‘Decision 
Making Panel’ because they are leaves in the ‘Evaluation System’ SoS model. Correspondingly, the 
highest level in the model is the original ‘Decision Making Panel’, which exists as an external actor 
outside the parent ‘Evaluation System’. Of course, the members of the ‘Decision Making Panel’ were 
themselves the subjects of an evaluation in order to gain their roles, but SAND has not (yet) captured 




Figure 6: Evaluation System Concepts extending SoSACRE [Holt, J and Perry, S 2013] 
The ‘Decision Making Panel’ must now select one or more candidates for the ‘System Under 
Evaluation’ in each ‘Evaluation System’, taking into account the ‘Property’ that are relevant to the 
‘Purpose’. Note that the concept of ‘Property’ includes ‘Behaviour’: 
1. Establish capability of organisations to “Design the feature with Cybersecurity in mind”: 
Conduct an audit whereby the ‘System Under Evaluation’ are the employees in SAND respon-
sible for (a) defining the requirements that are to be met by the system and feature(s) and (b) 
designing the features. The ‘Property’ of interest will be employees’ knowledge, skills and ex-
perience relating to cybersecurity-by-design. 
2. “Analyze threats … to determine what will be faced by the system”: 
Conduct a Threat and Risk Assessment (TARA) whereby the ‘System Under Evaluation’ is 
CoVe and the environment in which it operates. The ‘Property’ of interest will be the threats that 
CoVe is exposed to when operating. 
3. Choose “cybersecurity analysis (and management tools)” 
Perform a trade-off study whereby the ‘System Under Evaluation’ is multiple vulnerability da-
tabases that could be used to assist with cybersecurity analysis. The SAND leads note that there 
are many other analysis and management tools and techniques that they need to understand bet-
ter, however they need to constrain the scope of the pilot study. They have noticed that the dif-
ferent organisations in SAND all use different databases currently, so understanding their relative 
merits will be a useful place to start. They instruct the ‘Evaluation Panel’ to survey users about 
the important features (the ‘Property’) of the database they use already, what features they would 
like to have, and then to compare how well each of the candidate databases meets users’ ‘Need’ 
through its implementation of the required features. 
 
 
Recall that the purpose of SEA is to “assess and monitor the capabilities of suppliers and partner 
organisations with respect to the requirements of J3061”. The SEA ‘Evaluation system’ (parent) 
will consider each of the three child evaluations as a ‘System Under Evaluation’ and each of their 
‘Evaluation Result’ will serve as evidence. Because CoAST’s own activities have been included 
in the pilot study, this means that CoAST will be able to compare their suppliers’ capability 
against their own as a benchmark. The main ‘Property’ of interest for each child ‘System Under 
Evaluation’ is its ability to generate evidence that helps with assessing and monitoring capabili-
ties with respect to J3061. 
Chapter 3: Evaluation Panel Viewpoint (EPVp) 
 
Figure 7: EPVp scope (included to allow reader to quickly identify EPVp in Figure 2) 
The SAND leads ask each ‘Evaluation Panel’ to ensure it has understood its remit and allocate el-
ements of the evaluation to different ‘Evaluator’. Some ‘Grade’ may be determined by more than one 
evaluator to gain different perspectives, especially if there is subjectivity or risk of error involved. It 
may also not be possible to determine ‘Grade’ for every ‘Property’, for example if suitable meas-
urement equipment is not available. 
‘Evaluator’ interprets the set of ‘Need’ of each ‘System of Interest Stakeholder’ to make sure that 
every property that has a relevant impact is considered. They then establish the ‘Grade of Exhibition’ 
to establish the quality with which ‘System Under Evaluation’ exhibits each ‘Property’. In engi-
neering, ‘Grade of Exhibition’ will typically be a ‘Quantity Value’ (e.g. current rating of a wire) or a 
more subjective expression of how well a property is exhibited (e.g. high voltage). Figure 8 shows an 
example of how different types of ‘Grade’ might be organised. Next, an ‘Evaluator’ (often, but not 
necessarily, the same person) revisits each ‘Property’ to assign a ‘Grade’ that describes its impact on 
the affected ‘System Under Evaluation stakeholder’. 
‘Evaluator’ considers one or more ‘Claimable Item’ to assist them in determining ‘Grade’. Typically 
this would be some pieces of hard ‘Evidence’, such as measurements, but could also be an unsub-
stantiated claim. For example, a vendor might claim that they use a certain strength of encryption, but 
SAND does not have the capability to verify this. Once all ‘Grade’ have been assigned, the ‘Evalu-
ation Panel’ can apply a ‘Method’ to make sense of the collected ‘Grade’. In the simplest case this 
may simply be to pass all ‘Grade’ to a ‘Decision Maker’, but it could involve using a computed 
‘Algorithm’ or following a written procedure. 
SAND applies the following ‘Method’: 
1. A comparison of all key staff competences related to security-by-design against a security skills 
matrix developed specifically for the purpose. 
2. A Threat and Risk Analysis (TARA) using the E-Safety Vehicle Intrusion Protected Applications 
(EVITA) method from J3061. J3061 also recommends other methods, so the ‘Evaluation Panel’ 
includes a recommendation in its report (the ‘Evaluation Result’) that a separate evaluation of 
TARA methods should be performed to determine the one that best fits their ‘Need’. This best-fit 
 
 
study is outside the scope of the pilot, so they choose EVITA because they all enjoyed the mu-
sical! (This illustrates the serious point that not all decisions are taken on the basis of hard facts.) 
Even if the ‘Evaluation Panel’ do not record their questionable reasoning, an appropriate query 
on the model will still reveal that the decision was not underpinned by an item of ‘Evidence’. This 
might even serve as the trigger for another evaluation to establish a more suitable decision 
making process! 
3. ‘Evaluation Panel’ performs the ‘Need’ survey across the different organisations and applies a 
method that rolls up the ‘Grade’ to give a set of ‘Score’ that describe the relative strengths of the 
databases already in use alongside alternative options. 
 
Figure 8: Ontology of ‘Grade’ types 
Finally, the SEA ‘Evaluation Panel’ assigns a set of ‘Grade’ that express the effectiveness of the three 
child evaluations with respect to their ability to “assess and monitor the capabilities of suppliers and 
partner organisations with respect to the requirements of J3061”. This requires a much more sub-
jective method because, in this first instance, no benchmarks exist against which to compare the 
outputs of the child evaluations. They are careful to record their assumptions in their report so that 
these can be scrutinised when SEA is repeated and the organisations have more experience. The 
‘Evaluation Panel’ also reports on how SEA might be strengthened after the pilot study by adding 
further aspects of J3061 and other ‘Standard’ to the evaluation mix. 
Conclusions 
The Evaluation Ontology is a flexible, robust basis for modelling evaluation processes throughout an 
enterprise. It allows results from diverse evaluation practices to be mapped to a common pattern 
without requiring changes to existing processes. In An Automotive Security Story we have shown 
how to begin applying the Evaluation Ontology (EO) recursively to develop an evaluation tree that 
has both breadth and depth in terms of its reach in the enterprise. This makes it a scalable approach 
that delivers both immediate and long-term gains. We have identified a number of benefits of ap-
plying EO and cross reference these to the examples in the user story. The benefits are: 
 
 
 A common description of the way evaluation processes are implemented across the enterprise. 
o SAND was able to model the processes of three different organisations to assess capa-
bility with respect to J3061. 
 A means of combining disparate evaluation types (subjective and objective) to allow roll-up of 
results. Applicable to both technical (e.g. security hardware/software) and human aspects of 
systems (e.g. recruitment, user experience, review panel). 
o SAND decomposed its capability assessment to apply the ontology to evaluating human 
security skills, performing a TARA, and comparing security databases. 
 Tailoring the granularity of the model to match the level of rigour expected in evaluations of all 
types. 
o In their reports, the ‘Evaluation Panel’ were careful to identify further evaluations that 
would benefit the company. Without the awareness of the connectedness that applying the 
ontology brings, they would have been less likely to include this aspect in their reports. 
 Querying the model for business intelligence to identify areas of good and poor practice. 
o The same evaluations performed in isolation would have delivered insights into three 
different business areas, but the relationships between them would not have been cap-
tured. The querying power of the model grows exponentially as more evaluations are 
mapped, but even a small sample will raise awareness of, for example, how a recruitment 
process can impact a comparison of databases. 
 Straightforward gap analysis between required capabilities (e.g. as per J3061 [SAE 2016] and 
other emerging standards) and existing capabilities. 
o Even with a small pilot, the simple fact of the rigour imposed on SAND by the ontology 
meant the partner organisations quickly gained a clear impression of how much J3061 
demanded, how far they had to go, and how they could support each other. 
 Gaining a quantifiable, reportable level of confidence in security-related evaluations in all 
business areas e.g. for decision making, auditing. 
o Simply applying EO is enough to bring rigour to recording and reporting processes. 
Discoverability of information for business intelligence is greatly enhanced by applying 
EO. The company also gains by having documentation to prove they followed a struc-
tured process. 
 Quantifying the impact of decision making processes on the quality of upstream/downstream 
evaluations. 
o SAND now has an additional capability from the pilot that allows them, for example, to 
map the impact of employee skills in a supplier organisation to the security of the buyers’ 
products. 
The example considered in this work focuses on evaluation activities performed in early lifecycle 
stages. It should be noted that evaluation processes are key to successful engineering outcomes at all 
stages of the product and service lifecycle – verification and validation activities, for example, are by 
their very nature types of evaluation. EO has be structured so that it can be applied at any and all 
lifecycle stages. Applying the ontology widely across an enterprise provides valuable traceability 
between multiple evaluations and evaluation results, which can be leveraged extensively to provide 
intelligence about the quality of business and engineering processes and the products and services 
they deliver. 
Further Work 
Our goal is to develop a set of enabling patterns that can be applied to deliver acceptable and agreed 
levels of security throughout the connected vehicle lifecycle. To this end we will continue to develop 
new enabling patterns and extend those presented in [Holt, J and Perry, S 2013] and its companion 
volume [Holt et al. 2016]. The next step is to develop the Evaluation Ontology into a full Enabling 
 
 
Pattern with Viewpoints, Views and rule sets. We will also develop specialisations of the Evaluation 
Pattern to address specific types of evaluation (e.g. TARA, HARA, recruitment, tool selection). We 
anticipate then creating a corresponding SysML profile and exploring a real-world implementation 
with automotive partners. 
In this paper we have considered a process-centric view of security as followed in J3061. However, 
to be able to service all interpretations of security we will develop additional patterns that can be 
combined as customised security meta-patterns to deliver the specific security properties required in 
each unique system. The properties we target initially will be those identified in the classic CIA1 
(confidentiality, integrity and availability) triad of information security. Further, we will consider the 
additional properties proposed in the Information Assurance & Security (IAS) Octave [Schmidt, K et 
al. 2014] (privacy, authenticity & trustworthiness, non-repudiation, accountability, and auditability) 
and in the HEAVENS project [Lautenbach, A et al. 2016] (authenticity, authorization, 
non-repudiation, privacy, and freshness). 
We have identified two key patterns for immediate attention that we expect to help deliver the re-
quired properties. Evolvability is essential because the security threat landscape is in constant flux. 
Measurement, closely related to evaluation, is a natural candidate to complement the Evaluation 
Pattern.  
To ensure that our patterns meet real needs, we have planned a series of structured interviews with 
representative stakeholders from a wide range of industries involved in connected vehicles. We are 
also actively seeking organisations to provide real-world case studies that demonstrate the value of 
EO and future patterns applied in practice. The corresponding authors would welcome enquiries from 
interested organisations. 
EO accommodates both qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods and provides the basis for 
combining the two into a common framework. When EO is applied in practice, it will be essential to 
understand what can be measured in order to evaluate the effectiveness of applying EO. Where 
possible and relevant, key performance indicators used to describe the quality of existing evaluation 
processes will be adopted so organisations have a baseline against which to measure improvement. 
However, we anticipate that in many cases relevant indicators will not be actively measured with 
current practice. In the absence of such baseline indicators we will seek to demonstrate the following: 
value of traceability where none previously existed; facilitation of process consistency and reusa-
bility; new ability to align processes (within organisations and across supply chains and collaboration 
partners) and perform impact analysis; that EO is applicable to many types of evaluations. If possible, 
we would also apply EO retrospectively to a completed project that did not apply EO originally in 
order to establish what benefits might have been seen had it been used. 
Finally, because of the important relationship between security and safety, we also intend to clearly 
define relevant interfaces. We hope to demonstrate that many of the enabling patterns that benefit 
security will also work to the benefit of safety and other desirable system properties. 
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